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REEVALUATING SECTION 9-504(2) OF THE 

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 

DEFICIENCY ACTIONS AFTER COMMERCIALLY 

UNREASONABLE COLLATERAL SALES 

I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Factual Framework 
The Conrad Publishing Company borrowed $225,000 from the 
Bank of Burleigh County, North Dakota, in March 1968. To secure 
repayment of the debt, the publishing company offered certain 
printing equipment and real property as collateral. l Seven years 
later, the company defaulted in its payments with approximately 
$105,000 still due. The Small Business Administration (SBA), as­
signee of Conrad's promissory note, immediately repossessed Con­
rad's printing equipment and real property. The value of the real 
property was uncontested and the proceeds of its sale reduced the 
outstanding debt to $80,000. A sale of the company's remaining as­
sets was scheduled for one month later. 2 
The SBA did not advertise the foreclosure sale in trade jour­
nals or out-of-state newspapers, the most effective means of at­
tracting buyers, since printing equipment is marketed on a regional 
or national level. 3 The extent of the secured party's publicity ef­
forts was to mail letters to seven printers, distribute six hundred 
handbills and print a single advertisement in Bismarck and Fargo, 
North Dakota, newspapers.4 Both the district court and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that this pub­
1. This financing arrangement created a security interest in personal property 
to which Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) 
(1972). Since Conrad did not acquire the collateral with value given by the secured 
party, and did not give a security interest in the property to the bank to secure its 
price, a purchase money security interest was not created. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972). 
Whether or not the security interest created was a purchase money security interest, 
the treatment of the collateral on default is the same. See notes 20-24 infra and ac­
companying text. 
2. United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1978). 
3. Id. at 954. 
4. Id. at 951. 
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licity was inadequate. 5 The effectiveness of the advertising was re­
duced even further because it was disseminated much too close to 
the time of sales and the "right people" were not present to buy.7 
In addition, the equipment's value was uncertain because it had 
not been professionally appraised and the auctioneer hired to con­
duct the sale, being inexperienced, was unfamiliar with the value, 
use and operation of the printing machinery. 8 
Net proceeds of the sale totalled only $16,200, 9 while the 
publishing company owners estimated the actual value to be 
$165,000. 10 When the $16,200 proceeds were applied against the 
$80,000 loan balance, a deficiency of $63,800 remained which the 
SBA sought to collect in a suit for a deficiency judgment. The 
debtors objected that the secured party should not be allowed to 
collect the entire deficiency because the latter's own ineptness in 
handling the sale had reduced the collateral's resale price. 
The sequence of events in United States v. Conrad Publishing 
CO.11 is typical of many foreclosure sales. 12 The debtor defaults, the 
creditor conducts a foreclosure sale which is in some manner not 
commercially reasonable; the collateral is sold for less than the 
amount owed by the debtor, and less than it is purportedly worth; 
and the secured party seeks to recover the deficiency remaining be­
tween the amount realized from the sale and the outstanding debt. 
A creditor is required by the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) to be "commercially reasonable" in disposing ofcollateral, 13 
5. Id. at 954. 
6. To determine whether a sale was commercially reasonable, courts look to ev­
ery aspect of the sale: Amount of advertising; normal commercial practices in dis­
posing of particular collateral; length of time elapsing between repossession and re­
sale; whether the collateral had deteriorated; the number of persons contacted con­
cerning the sale; and the price obtained. Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest 
Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 454-55,535 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1975). 
7. United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 949, 952 n.2 (8th CiT. 
1978). 
8. Id. at 952. 
9. Gross proceeds totalled approximately $22,500. Deduction of about $6,300 in 
expenses resulted in net proceeds of $16,200. Id. 
10. The debtors estimated that the value of the equipment was $165,000. The 
secured party guessed that the value was $50,000. Id. at 951. At trial it was deter­
mined that the auction brought only 50% of the amount that could have been real­
ized at a properly handled sale. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals found 
no basis in the record for the trial court's finding and remanded for a determination 
of the loss caused by failure to comply with Article 9. Id. at 955. 
11. 589 F.2d 949 (8th CiT. 1978). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th CiT. 1979); United States 
v. Cawley, 464 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Wash. 1979); Kobuk Eng'r & Contracting Servs., 
Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr. Co-Alaska, Inc., 568 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1977). 
13. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1972): 
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a standard which is not defined in the U. C. C.14 Two recur­
ring types of commercial unreasonableness on the part of the se­
cured party have emerged in secured transactions case law. The 
first, as illustrated in Conrad, arises when the sale itself is con­
ducted in a way that casts doubt on whether the collateral's maxi­
mum price was realized. IS The other occurs when a sale of the 
debtor's collateral is executed by the secured party with no noti­
fication to the debtor. For example, in Security Trust Co. v. 
Thomas,16 debtors arranged to buy a tractor by borrowing $25,000 
from a bank to finance the purchase and by giving the bank a secu­
rity interest in the tractor. After defaulting, the debtor delivered 
his tractor to the dealer. Notice of sale was sent to the debtor, but 
it was returned marked "incorrect address." The sale was cancelled 
because only one bid, considered too low, was received. Three 
weeks later, the tractor was sold at a private sale for $4,000. 17 In 
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and 
may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may 
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but ev­
ery aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and 
terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or 
threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any pub­
lic sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or 
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party 
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or 
modifying his right to notification of sale.... 
Id. 
14. Though "commercially reasonable" is not defined, some tests are set out in 
U.C.C. 	§ 9-507(2) (1972): 
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different 
time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not 
of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially 
reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the collateral in the 
usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price 
current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in 
conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type 
of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. The prin­
ciples stated in the two preceding sentences with respect to sales also apply 
as may be appropriate to other types of disposition. A disposition which has 
been approved in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' 
committee or representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be 
commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate that any such 
approval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any disposi­
tion not so approved is not commercially reasonable. 
Id. 
15. See generally Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 
N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975). 
16. 59 App. Div. 2d 242, 399 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1977). 
17. 	 Id. at 244, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
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order to maintain an action for a deficiency judgment, the secured 
party was required to prove that both notice and sale had been 
reasonable. IS Courts hold creditors to the standard of commercial 
reasonableness regardless of whether the facts involve the ade­
quacy of notice prior to sale, or the reasonableness of the sale it­
self. 19 
B. The Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 9 of the V.C.C. regulates secured transactions. The 
Code provides that upon a debtor's default, the secured party may 
repossess the collateral securing the debt20 and sell it at a public or 
private sale,21 every aspect of which must be commercially reason­
able. 22 After the sale, the secured party is liable to the debtor for 
any amount realized in excess of the debt, and the debtor is like­
wise liable to the secured party for any "deficiency."23 When the 
Conrad Publishing Company defaulted on its loan payments,24 the 
secured party's repossession and subsequent resale of its printing 
equipment was sanctioned by the V.C.C. Had the sale been com­
mercially reasonable, Conrad would have been liable for the full 
$63,800 deficiency remaining between the resale price and the 
debt. 
Nowhere in the Code is "deficiency" defined, though its 
meaning is crucial to determination of the parties' rights and liabili­
ties on default and resale of the debtor's collateral. Two possible 
methods of measuring a deficiency are: (1) Computing the differ­
ence between the outstanding debt and the collateral's resale price 
at the time of the foreclosure sale; or (2) computing the difference 
18. Id. at 243,247,399 N.Y.S.2d at 511,514. 
19. United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 256 (6th Cir. 1979). 
20. "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed with­
out judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed 
by action...." U.C.G § 9-503 (1972). 
21. Id. § 9-504(3). 
22. [d. Article 9 does not give a specific definition of what constitutes a com­
mercially reasonable sale. For factors considered by the courts, see generally note 6, 
supra. 
23. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1972): 

If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must ac­

count to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor 

is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of 

accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for 

any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides. 

[d. 
24. 589 F.2d at 949. 
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between the outstanding debt and the collateral's fair market value 
at the time of the foreclosure sale. When the resale price is the re­
sult of a commercially reasonable transaction, the secured party 
could do nothing more to get a higher price for the collateral, and 
resale price represents fair market value. Following a commercially 
unreasonable transaction, however, defining "deficiency" as the dif­
ference between the outstanding debt and the collateral's resale 
price produces a harsh result. That definition of "deficiency" allows 
the secured party to benefit from his own unlawful behavior by 
forcing the debtor to absorb the cost of the creditor's errors at 
the foreclosure sale. 
As will be discussed in part II(C),25 "deficiency" should be de­
fined consistently as the difference between the outstanding debt 
and the fair market value of the collateral at the tim~ of the fore­
closure sale. In a good faith, reasonable resale of collateral, resale 
price should be the same as the fair market value. 26 If the sale is 
unreasonable, resale price is presumed to be different from fair 
market value, and therefore resale price should not be used to 
measure the secured party's recoverable deficiency. 
When the secured party does not comply with the foreclosure 
sale requirements of Article 9, it is not clear to what extent 
the debtor is liable for the amounts claimed by the secured 
party. No relationship can be drawn within Article 9 between 
the effect of an unreasonable sale and the debtor's liability for a 
deficiency.27 Some courts, referring to prior law, require strict 
compliance with section 9-504(3) as a condition precedent to the 
bringing of a deficiency action. 28 Others, to resolve the uncer­
tainty caused by the U.C.C.'s inexplicit definition of deficiency, 
have focused on the relationship between section 9-504(3), requir­
ing a commercially reasonable disposition, and section 9-507(1), 
25. See text accompanying notes 172 & 173 infra. 
26. Two authorities believe that sales of similar property are evidence of fair 
market value, inferring that resale price of collateral is evidence of fair market value. 
"In case of ordinary personal property where market value is sought ... the most ob­
vious resort [to determine value] is to evidence of what other similar property ... 
currently sold for on the market...." C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 177 (1935). Even 
where there is no market for goods, "there may be isolated or individually negoti­
ated sales of similar property that will furnish ~ome evidence of value." D. DOBBS, 
LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.12, at 391 (1973). 
27. "The relationship between the debtor's liability for a deficiency and the se­
cured party's liability for noncompliance with the required default procedures seems 
to have escaped the conscious attention of the Article 9 draftsmen...." 2 G. 
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1263-64 (1965). 
28. See text accompanying notes 54-58 infra. 
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allowing the debtor to recover "any loss" due to creditor noncom­
pliance with Article 9. These courts have sought in section 9-507(1) 
a defense to a secured party's deficiency action when an unreasona­
ble sale already has been conducted. 29 Courts have grappled with 
the question of whether the injured debtor must allege and prove 
his own separate action for damages, or whether there is some 
mechanism within the Code ameliorating the debtor's plight when 
he has been wronged by an unreasonable disposition of his collat­
eral. The results have been inconsistent. Some courts have found 
that section 9-507(1) is unrelated to a deficiency action,30 others 
have used this section to deny the secured party's deficiency judg­
ment completely,31 and still others find it to be the source of the 
debtor's exclusive remedy, an action to recover actual damages. 32 
This comment explains that the courts' inquiry into the rela­
tionship between sections 9-504(3) and 9-507(1) has been misdi­
rected, thereby precluding study of an alternative solution to the 
problem of how to treat a deficiency action after a commercially 
unreasonable sale of collateral. The effect of commercial unreasona­
bleness on the debtor's obligation to pay a deficiency is better re­
vealed in the relationship between sections 9-504(3) and 9-504(2). 
Failure to comply with section 9-504(3)'s mandate of commercial rea­
sonableness should not necessarily alter the debtor's method of re­
covering losses via section 9-507(1). Rather, the definition of "defi­
ciency" proposed, that is, the difference between fair market value 
and debt, not resale price and debt, should be incorporated into 
section 9-504(2), and the burden of proof as to that fair market 
value should be put on the secured party, not the debtor. 
V.C.C. section 9-507(1) provides the debtor with the right to 
recover "any los$" caused by the secured party's failure to comply 
with all of the default provisions of Article 9. 33 When the secured 
29. Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 495 (Iowa 1977) (stat­
ute precluded plaintiff from recovery of a deficiency judgment). 
30. Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 
(1972) (U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1972) is intended as an affirmative action to recover loss, 
not a defense to a deficiency action). 
31. Herman Ford-Mercury, ~nc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 495 (Iowa 1977). 
32. See note 51 infra. 
33. V.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1972): 
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance 
with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or restrained on 
appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor 
or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been 
made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to re­
cover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the 
provisions of this Part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a 
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party's debt is satisfied by the proceeds of a collateral sale and he 
is not seeking to collect a deficiency, the secured party can still be 
sued by the debtor under section 9-507(1) for any action not in 
compliance with the Code that caused loss to the debtor. Under 
section 9-507(1), the debtor must prove his own damages. 34 
The secured party may be held liable35 for damages suffered 
by the debtor for personal injury as a result of forceful reposses­
sion,36 failure to perform duties properly as pledgee,37 failure to 
make collection from an account debtor in a commercially reason­
able manner,38 any impropriety in connection with an attempt to 
retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt 39 or any action prej­
udicial to the debtor's right ofredemption.4o 
When the debtor seeks damages affirmatively for losses caused 
by the secured party stemming from reasons other than a defi­
ciency situation, the debtor has the burden of proof.41 For exam­
ple, if the secured party injures the debtor's property or person in 
repossessing the collateral, the debtor must affirmatively prove that 
damage. Section 9-507(1) has also been interpreted to require the 
debtor to carry his own burden of proof of damages when he as­
serts unreasonableness as a defense to a deficiency action. The se­
cured party is, however, allowed to recover a deficiency regardless 
of his unreasonable disposition, and hence, regardless of the collat­
eral's actual value. This unfairly burdens the debtor with the diffi­
cult task of proving the market value of used collateral for which 
there is no established market42 in order for him to recover dam­
ages after he has been wronged by the secured party. In the case 
of a commercially unreasonable sale, the debtor, by being forced to 
right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service 
charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time 
price differential plus 10 per cent of the cash price. 
ld. 
34. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast, 84 Wash. 2d 1004, _, 521 P.2d 1191, 
1196 (1974) (rule under § 9-507(1) is that burden of proof of damages is on party as­
serting them). 
35. See generally Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Scott, 86 Wash. 2d 276, 279, 
543 P.2d 638, 641 (1976); 69 AM. JUR. 2d Secured Transactions § 648, at 561 (1973.) 
36. Roberts v. Speck, 169 Wash. 613, 615-16, 14 P.2d 33, 34 (1932). 




41. For situations in which the debtor may bring a § 9-507(1) action against the 
secured party, and must carry his own burden of proof, see text accompanying note 35 
supra. 
42. Valuation of goods for which there is no established market, such as used 
goods, like repossessed collateral, is difficult. See generally D. DOBBS, LAW OF 
REMEDIES § 5.12, at 390-92 (1973). 
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prove the price that the collateral should have sold for, must prove 
both the unfair gain of the secured party as well as his own loss. 
This unfair result could be avoided by shifting the burden of proof 
as to market value to the secured party in the wake of an unreason­
able disposition. 
Because the consequences of commercial unreasonableness on 
the recovery of . deficiency judgments are not specified in the 
U . C. C., courts have taken great liberties in fashioning remedies43 
when a creditor pursues a deficiency judgment after an unreason­
able foreclosure sale. Courts have reached inconsistent results 
when the secured party himself has been commercially unreasona­
ble in conducting the collateral sale. 44 Judicial response to "the 
misbehaving creditor ... spans the spectrum of possible results"45 
with treatment ranging from completely denying a deficiency judg­
ment to allowing the debtor whatever setoff he can prove in a sec­
tion 9-507(1) action. 46 Whether the Code drafters intended to leave 
this issue open for flexibility,47 or neglected to address it,48 or 
thought the U.C.C. provisions were clear, is hotly debated among 
courts, commentators and legal scholars. 49 
II. APPROACHES TO DEFICIENCY ACTIONS FOLLOWING 

COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLE SALES 

Three major lines of authority have evolved in the controversy 
surrounding the granting of deficiency judgments when there has 
43. Not only do jurisdictions differ, but state courts themselves are in conflict. 
For example, Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35, reprinted in 5 
U.C.C. REP. SERVo 788 (1964), holding that the debtor's remedy was solely a § 
9-507(1) action for damages, was ignored by One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 
Mass. App. Dec. 64, reprinted in 5 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 792 (1968), which completely 
denied the secured party a deficiency judgment. 
44. Compare Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35, reprinted 
in 5 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 788 (1964) with One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 
Mass. App. Dec. 64, reprinted in 5 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 792 (1968). 
45. R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-14, at 1005 
(1972). 
46. See note 51 infra. 
47. Hall V. Owen County State Bank, 60 Ind. 221, 370 N.E.2d 918, 928, re­
printed in 23 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 267 (Ct. App. 1977); Note, A Creditor's Right to a 
Deficiency Judgment Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Effect of 
Lack of Notice, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 56, 79 (1975). 
48. G. GILMORE, supra note 27. 
49. The classic contrast, illustrating the division of opinion, is that two eminent 
authorities disagree. Compare Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 86 BANKING L.J. 
965 (1969), reprinted in 2 U.C.C. L.J. 244 (1970) (§ 9-507(1) is the debtor's exclusive 
remedy) with G. GILMORE, supra note 27 (complete compliance with Part Five of Ar­
ticle 9 is a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency). 
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been a commercially unreasonable sale. At one extreme is the 
debtor-oriented approach that completely denies the creditor any 
deficiency judgment. 50 The other extreme allows the creditor to re­
coup the shortage between the resale price and the remaining 
debt, but leaves the debtor to prove his own damages, including 
those incurred because of the secured party's noncompliance with 
the Code, by way of counterclaim or separate action. 51 This ap­
proach uses section 9-507(1) as the exclusive remedy. 
A novel approach which some courts have adopted, moderat­
ing between these two, arises in a deficiency action by finding that 
the secured party's disposition of the collateral was unreasonable. A 
rebuttable presumption arises that the sale price of the collateral is 
SO. Comfort Trane Air Conditioning Co. v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 
1979); In re Carter, 511 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1975); Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack 
Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659 (D. Okla. 1972); Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. 
Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (D. Pa. 1963); Western Decor & Furnishings Indus., 
Inc. v. Bank of America, 91 Cal. App. 3d 293, 154 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1979); Atlas Thrift 
Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Randolph v. Franklin 
Inv. Co., 398 A.2d 340 (D.C. App. 1979); Gavin v. Washington Post Employees Fed. 
Credit Union, 397 A.2d 968 (D.C. App. 1979); Barnett v. Barnett Bank, 345 So.2d 420 
(Fla. App. 1977); Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 
(1968); Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Gutshall, 274 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1979); 
Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1977); Union Trust Co. 
v. Hardy, 400 A.2d 384 (Me. 1979); Camden Nat' I Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 
(Me. 1973); One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass. App. Dec. 64, reprinted in 
5 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 792 (1968); Gateway Aviation, Inc. V. Cessna Aircraft Co., 577 
S.W. 2d 860 (Mo. App. 1979); Citizens State Bank V. Sparks, 202 Neb. 661, 276 
N.W.2d 661 (1979); DeLay First Nat'! Bank & Trust CO. V. Jacobson Appliance, 196 
Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt 
Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089,323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971); Miles v .. N.J. Motors, Inc., 44 
Ohio App.2d 351, 338 N.E.2d 784 (1975); Davidson V. First Bank & Trust Co., Yale, 
559 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1976); FMA Financial Corp. V. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 
1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Bums, 562 P.2d 233 (Utah 1977); Jackson State Bank 
V. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978); Aimonetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972); 
Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Under­
world and a Proposed Salvation, 51 OR. L. REV. 302 (1972); Lakin, Default Proceed­
ings Under Article 9: Problems, Solutions, and Lessons to be Learned, 8 AKRON L. 
REV. 1 (1974); Note, Denial of Deficiency: A Problem of Reasonable Notice Under 
U.C.C. § 9-504(3), 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 657 (1973). 
51. Barbour V. United States, 562 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1977); Abbott Motors, Inc. 
v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35, reprinted in 5 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 788 (1964); 
Jones v. Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 455, 228 N.W.2d 419 (1975); Wilson Leasing CO. V. 
Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 53 Mich. App. 359, 220 N.W.2d 83 (1974); Lincoln 
Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard, 75 Misc. 2d 181, 347 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Rochester, N.Y., 
City Ct. 1973); Mallicoat V. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 
S.W.2d 347 (1966); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast, 11 Wash. App. 117, 521 
P.2d 1191 (1974); Hogan, supra note 49; Comment, Remedies for Failure to Notify 
Debtor of Disposition of Repossessed Collateral Under the U.C.C., 44 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 221 (1972). 
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equal to the outstanding debt unless the creditor can prove the col­
lateral's fair market value52 at the time of sale. If the fair market 
value is established by the creditor, he can collect a deficiency. 
That deficiency would be determined by the difference between 
the fair market value, which mayor may not be the same as the 
resale price, and the outstanding debt. This method excludes from 
the deficiency whatever was lost because of the secured party's im­
proper procedure in disposing of the collateral. 53 No deficiency will 
be allowed if he cannot sustain his burden of proof as to what the 
collateral was really worth when sold. The merits and deficiencies 
of each approach warrant examination. 
52. The limited application of this procedure should be emphasized. If the 
court finds that every aspect of the secured party's action was commercially reasona­
ble, the amount received at the foreclosure sale is the fair market value, regardless of 
how low it was. Cases which have used this approach include United States v. 
Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 
F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 
1974); In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973); Leasing Assoc., Inc. v. Slaughter & 
Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cawley, 464 F. Supp. 189 
(E.D. Wash. 1979); Fedders Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961 (D. Minn. 1979); In re 
Thomas, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 578 (W.D. Ya. 1973); Kobuk Eng'r & Contracting 
Servs., Inc. V. Superior Tank & Constr. Co-Alaska, Inc., 568 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1977); 
Weaver V. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1969): Universal C.I.T. Credit 
CO. V. Rone, 248 Ark. 665,453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Norton V. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 
240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Community Management Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 
Colo. App. 33, 505 P.2d 1314 (1973); Savings Bank V. Booze, 34 Conn. Super. 632, 
382 A.2d 226 (1977); Associates Financial Servs. Co. v. DiMarco, 383 A.2d 296 (Del. 
Super. 1978); General Foods Corp. v. Hall, 39 Ill. App.3d 147, 349 N.E.2d 573 
(1976); Hall V. Owen County State Bank, 60 Ind. Dec. 221, 370 N.E.2d 918, re­
printed in 23 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 267 (Ct. App. 1977); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Reed, 
212 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1973); Harris V. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (Ct. App. 
1972); McKee V. Mississippi Bank & Trust Co., 366 So.2d 234 (Miss. 1979); Walker v. 
Y.M. Box Motor Co., 325 So.2d 905 (Miss. 1976); Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263 
(Mo. App. 1974); Cornett V. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 209 N.w'2d 341 
(1973); Levers V. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 93 Nev. 95, 560 P.2d 917 (1977); New 
Jersey Bank v. Green, 145 N.J. Super. 560,368 A.2d 431 (1976); Franklin State Bank 
V. Parker, 136 N.J. Super. 476, 346 A.2d 632 (1975); Conti Causeway Ford V. Jarossy, 
114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971); Clark Leasing Corp. V. White Sands Forest 
Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975); Security Trust Co. v. Thomas, 59 
App. Div.2d 242, 399 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1977); Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. 
Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1961); Farmers State Bank v. Otten, 87 S.D. 161, 204 
N.W.2d 178 (1973); Investors Acceptance CO. V. James Talcott, Inc., 61 Tenn. App. 
307, 454 S.W.2d 130 (1969); Tackett V. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 579 S.W.2d 
545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Yic Hansen & Sons v. Crowley, 57 Wis.2d 106, 203 
N.W.2d 728 (1973); Minetz, Maya "Wrongdoer" Recover a Deficiency Judgment, or 
Is Section 9-507(1) a Debtor's Exclusive Remedy?, 6 U.C.C. L.J. 344 (1974); Pass & 
Walker, Deficiency Judgments in Florida After a Commercially Unreasonable Sale 
of Collateral, 52 FLA. B.J. 720 (1978). 
53. In other words, the newly established fair market value, not the sale price, 
is offset against the deficiency still owed by the debtor. 
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A. Complete Denial of a Deficiency Judgment-Pro and Can 
The apparent majority holds that failure to comply with sec­
tion 9-504(3) bars recovery of a deficiency judgment54 by the se­
cured party. Among the justifications for this position is that the 
predecessor to Article 9, the Vniform Conditional Sales Act 
(V.C.S.A.),55 was consistently interpreted to exclude recovery of 
deficiency judgments unless there had been "literal compliance" 
with V.C.S.A. resale provisions. 56 The reasoning continues that, 
had the Article 9 drafters intended to overthrow the old statute 
and its judicial interpretation, they "surely would have manifested 
that intent in clear and unambiguous language. "57 Since the 
V.C.C. is silent about this point, then arguably, the V.C.C. im­
plicitly adopted the prior practices of the V. C. S. A. 58 
The most emphatic and prevalent reason propounded by the 
courts for refusing to grant the secured party a deficiency judg­
ment59 is that the creditor, by failing to notify the debtor of the 
time and place of the foreclosure sale, has deprived the debtor 
of his "right to redeem" the collateral6o guaranteed by section 
9-506. 61 To redeem the collateral, the debtor must repay in full the 
outstanding sum owed to the secured party. Even if the debtor 
does not have the money to redeem, he should at least have an op­
portunity to protect his interests by finding prospective buyers, or 
by other means. 62 A few cases even say that section 9-504(3) was 
passed to protect the debtor, especially his right to redeem, and 
54. But see Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 
451,455, 535 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1975) (refusing to follow the "majority"). 
55. The U.C.S.A. was superseded by the U.C.C. 
56. G. GILMORE, supra note 27, at 1263. 
57. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 
091,323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971). 
58. In re Carter, 511 F.2d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975); Note, supra note 50, at 
662. 
59. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. 
60. U.C.C. § 9-506 (1972) gives the debtor the right to redeem the collateral by 
tendering fulfillment of all obligations anytime before the secured party has dis­
posed of the goods. 
61. Failure to send notice also denies the right to challenge disposition before 
it is made, and the opportunity to find an interested buyer. [1979] lA BENDER'S 
U.C.C. SERVICE § 8.06 [2], at 935. 
62. DeLay First Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Jacobson Appliance, 196 Neb. 398, 
402-03, 243 N.W.2d 745, 748 (1976). Without notice, the debtor is prevented from 
exercising the following rights: Knowing where the property is, and showing it to po­
tential lenders who may demand a security interest in it; and attending the sale and 
seeing that it is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. Randolph v. Frank­
lin Inv. Co., 398 A.2d 340, 345 (D.C. App. 1979). 
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when that right is denied him, sufficient justification exists for 
depriving the secured party of his right to collect a deficiency judg­
ment. 63 Disallowing a deficiency judgment is considered to be the 
only effective deterrent to improper creditor conduct. 64 
Another justification for completely denying recovery of a defi­
ciency judgment is that the secured party'i invaluable right to re­
possess and resell collateral without judicial intervention has been 
granted by Article 9 in exchange ,for compliance with minimal 
formal requirements. 65 Observing the law by complying with the 
V.C.C.'s "simple" and "quite modest"66 conditions of sale is hardly, 
an onerous burden to the secured party.67 The strict, no-deficiency 
rule is considered an appropriate debtor remedy because compli­
ance with the V.C.C. is easy, and noncompliance substantially 
prejudices the debtor. 68 
The no-deficiency school also substantiates its procedure of 
denying a deficiency judgment by the general Code provisions of 
Article 1 rather than those of Article 9. 69 Section 1-106, allowing 
for a liberal administration of remedies, provides courts with the 
power to fashion appropriate remedies when compensatory dam­
ages are insufficient. 70 Accordingly, cancellation of indebtedness is 
the only adequate compensation for debtors' deprivation of the 
right of redemption. 71 In other words, in the wake of an unreason­
able sale, the aggrieved party is not limited to the remedies 
conferred by Article 9. 72 The no-deficiency rule is considered an 
appropriate supplement to the V.C.C.73 
63. In re Carter, 511 F.2d 1203, 1204 (9th Cir. 1975); Herman Ford-Mercury, 
Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, (Iowa 1977); One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 
40 Mass. App. Dec. 64, reprinted in 5 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 792 (1968). 
64. Lakin, supra note 50, at 30-31; Note, supra note 50, at 668. 
65. Lakin, supra note 50, at 30-31. 
66. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 
1091,323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971). 
67. DeLay First Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 
409,243 N.W.2d 745,751 (1976). 
68. Randolph V. Franklin Inv. Co., Inc., 398 A.2d 340, 347 (D.C. App. 1979). 
69. Davidson V. First Bank & Trust Co., Yale, 559 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Okla. 1976); 
Note, supra note 50, at 659. 
70. Camden Nat'l Bank V. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1973); Note, supra 
note 50, at 659. ' 
71. Even the debtor's right to receive punitive damages has been justified by 
U.C.C. § 1-106 (1972). The argument goes that since the right to punitive damages 
exists outside the Code, they are retained through § 1-106. Davidson v. First Bank & 
Trust Co., Yale, 559 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Okla. 1976); Hogan, The Secured Party and 
Default Proceedings Under the U.C.C., 47 MINN. L. REV. 205, 241 n.170 (1962) (as­
serting that § 1-106 should grant the wronged debtor a remedy). 
72. 4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 623 (2d ed. 1971). 
73. Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1973). 
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Courts following the approach which completely bars recovery 
of a deficiency judgment commonly support their decisions per­
functorily.74 These courts mechanically cite cases in their favor or 
use the scant rationale that a majority of courts support their view, 
with little or no discussion of the merits of the various approaches. 
One secured transactions authority75 thinks that the no-deficiency 
rule has developed because early decisions disregarded the Code 
due to an inadequate understanding of its complicated statutory 
provisions, and subsequent cases blindly used stare decisis. 76 
Various substantive criticisms of the no-deficiency rule militate 
against its continued use. The argument proposed by those who 
contend that the U.C.C. should follow its predecessor, the 
U.C.S.A.,77 is rebutted in part by the language of Official Com­
ment 1 to section 9-504. Comment 1 explicitly states that the Code 
does not follow the elaborate notice provisions of the U.C.S.A., 
and that the only restriction on disposition of collateral is that it 
must be commercially reasonable. 78 Despite this Comment, the 
U.C.C. and u.c.s.A. sections regarding deficiency judgments and 
damages are drafted similarly. U.C.C. section 9-504(2), making the 
buyer liable for a deficiency, is comparable to U.C.S.A. section 
22;79 and U.C.C. section 9-507(1), allowing the buyer to recover 
74. See Barnett v. Barnett Bank, 345 So.2d 804, 806 (Fla. App. 1977) (noting 
that there is a division of authority, but deciding to follow Florida district courts and 
deny a deficiency judgment with no consideration of the merits of alternatives); 
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Bums, 562 P.2d 233, 234 (Utah 1977) (holding that a defi ­
ciency judgment would be denied, without citing precedent). 
75. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. 360 (2d ed. 
1979). 
76. Id. 
77. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra. 
78. The Uniform Commercial Sales Act insisted on a sale at public auction 
with elaborate provisions for the giving of notice of sale. This section fol­
lows the more liberal provisions of the Trust Receipts Act. ... The only re­
striction placed on the secured party's method of disposition is that it must 
be commercially reasonable. 
U.C.G § 9-504, Official Comment 1 (1972). See also Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 
114 N.]. Super. 382, 385, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (1971). 
79. Compare U.C.C.§ 9-504(2) (1972) with U.C.S.A. § 22. 

If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must ac­

count to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor 

is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of 

accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for 

any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides. 

U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1972). 
If the proceeds of the resale are not sufficient to defray the expenses 
thereof, and also the expenses of retaking, keeping and storing the goods 
and the balance due upon the purchase price, the seller may recover the de­
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damages for creditor noncompliance with default provisions, is vir­
tually identical to V.C.S.A. section 25. 80 Most of the V.C.S.A. 
cases hold that perfect compliance with the Act is essential to re­
covery of the balance due the seller under the conditional sales 
contract. 81 These pre-V.C.C., V.C.S.A. cases must be distin­
guished from those arising under the V.C.C. to determine whether 
the V.C.C. cases should be interpreted differently. 
The V.C.S.A. resale provisions required the conditional 
vendor to comply with strict deadlines in notifying the debtor of 
intention to retake the goods,82 the number of days the goods had 
to be retained for buyer redemption,83 the number of days after 
retaking in which the sale of goods had to be held84 and the type 
of notification that had to be given to the buyer regarding the im­
pending sale. 85 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski86 illustrates 
how precisely the courts interpreted the V.C.S.A.'s resale provi­
sions. The seller advertised the sale of repossessed collateral in the 
newspaper for four instead of the requisite five days, and the court 
held that the seller had failed to comply with the statute. His defi­
ciency action was denied. 87 
ficiency from the buyer, or from anyone who has succeeded to the obliga­
tions of the buyer. 
U.C.S.A. § 22. 
80. Compare U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1972) with U.C.S.A. § 25. 
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance 
with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or restrained on 
appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor 
or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been 
made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to re­
cover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the 
provisions of this Part.... 
U.C.C. 	§ 9-507(1) (1972). 
If the seller fails to comply with the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 
23 after retaking the goods, the buyer may recover from the seller his actual 
damages, if any, and in no event less than one-fourth of the sum of all pay­
ments which have been made under the contract, with interest. 
U.C.S.A. § 25. 
81. Farmers Bank v. Odom, 246 A.2d 85 (Del. 1968); United Sec. Corp. v. 
Tomlin, 57 Del. 219, 198 A.2d 179 (1964); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski, 57 
Del. 76, 195 A.2d 546 (1963); Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 37 N.J. 420, 181 A.2d 
499 (1962); Bergen Auto Co. v. Mattarochio, 58 N.]. Super. 161, 155 A.2d 787 (1959). 
See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 
323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 15,82 (1956). 
82. U.C.S.A. § 17. 
83. ld. § 18. 
84. ld. § 19. 
85. ld. 
86. 57 Del. 76, 195 A.2<i 546 (1963). 
87. ld. at 80, HJ5 A.2<i at 548. 
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The judicial interpretation that compliance with the U.C.S.A. 
provisions was a prerequisite to bringing a deficiency action 
stemmed from the nature of the Act itself. Since the Act mandated 
the exact procedures vendors were required to follow, precise com­
pliance was expected of them. The opportunity for error was great, 
since the statute set forth meticulous standards. The courts found 
any slight noncompliance with the statute reason for denying a de­
ficiency judgment. 88 The right to bring a deficiency claim on a con­
ditional sales contract was held to be a statutory right; therefore, 
the statutory resale provisions had to be followed if a suit was to be 
maintained. 89 
Underlying these decisions was the belief that the U.C.S.A. 
was drafted primarily to protect buyers from imposition by sell­
90ers. Secondarily, the courts reasoned that the U.C.S.A. notice 
requirements91 were aimed at informing the widest possible num­
ber of buyers of the impending sale of repossessed collateral. 92 The 
statute required sellers to follow the Act's precise procedures so 
that prospective bidders would be informed of the sale and, conse­
quently, a good price would be obtained for the goods. 93 
The unarticulated basis for the harsh treatment of noncom­
plying conditional sellers seems to be that the statute's notice pro­
visions, considered mandatory,94 created a scheme that would, if 
followed precisely, effectively protect buyers from abuse by sellers 
of repossessed goods. 95 The U. C. C. expressly rejects the notion 
that dictating the exact conditions of sale will cause a higher reali­
zation on collateral. 96 Rather, the general obligation of good faith, 
the requirement of commercial reasonableness and the U.C.C.'s 
own sanctions are considered appropriate standards in commercial 
transactions. 
Denying secured parties the right to collect a deficiency judg­
ment effectively awards the debtor the cancellation of his remain­
88. Id. 
89. Bergen Auto Co. v. Mattarochio, 58 N.J. Super. 161, 165, 155 A.2d 787, 789 
(1959). 
90. 57 Del. at 80, 195 A.2d at 548; Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 37 N.J. 420, 
427, 181 A.2d 499, 503 (1962). 
91. See V.C.S.A. §§ 16-20. 
92. Farmers Bank v. Odom, 246 A.2d 85, 88 (Del. 1968). 
93. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lawley, 47 N.J. Super. 207,213, 135 A.2d 546, 
549 (1957). 
94. 57 Del. at 79, 195 A.2d at 546. 
95. Farmers Bank \'. Odom, 246 A.2d 85 (Del. 1968); Commercial Credit Corp. 
\'. Lawle~', -!7 N.J. Super. 207,135 A.2d 546 (1957). 
96. See V.C.C. § 9-504, Ofl'icial Comment 1 (1972). 
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ing, validly-owed debt as damages. This is contrary to the spirit of 
commercial reasonableness of the Code, which should allow the in­
jured party to be compensated, not punished. 97 As the leading case 
of Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc. 98 
states, barring a deficiency "smacks of the punitive...."99 In the 
unreasonable collateral resale situation, the debtor is compensated 
for what he. lost by denying the secured party the difference be-
I 
tween the resale price of the collateral and its fair market value. 
This c~edits the debtor with the amount lost by the secured par­
ty's unreasonableness, and effectively, the secured party forfeits 
the sum which he was responsible for losing. Completely denying 
recovery of a deficiency is punitive because the secured party is 
denied both the amount representing the difference between resale 
price and fair market value, and the remaining debt which was un­
affected by the unreasonable t}ansaction. 
Automatic denia\ not only rejects the V.C.C. policy barring 
punitive damages, 100 'but also displaces the actual Code provisions 
remedying the debtor's IOSS.101 Nothing in Article 9 "snuffs out" a 
creditor's right to a deficiency judgment. 102 No provision of the 
V.C.C. explicitly denies recovery of the deficiency when there is 
defective notice. 103 The bar rule is contrary to the Code and also is 
an irrational measure of damages. V sually the debtor's only loss re­
sulting from an unreasonable sale is the failure of the collateral to 
bring its fair market value. There are methods of retrieving this 
loss as damages, including section 9-507(1).104 
Proponents of the no-deficiency rule maintain that the major 
loss to a debtor unnotified of the sale of collateral is the invaluable 
right to redeem, and that barring a deficiency recovery is the debt­
or's only means of recompense. lOS A fallacy of this argument is that 
97. V.C.C. § 1-106, Official Comment I (1972). Punitive damages have no place 
in a commercial context. Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 501, 209 
N.W.2d 341, 344 (1973). 
98. 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975); accord, Kobuk Eng'r & Contracting 
Servs., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr. Co-Alaska, Inc., 568 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska 
1977). 
99. 87 N.M. at 455, 535 P.2d at 1081. 
100. See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 supra. 
'. : .. 101. Pass & Walker, supra note 52, at 722 . 
. " 102. Clark, supra note 50, at 319 . 
.... 103. Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 385, 276 A.2d 402, 
·'404 (1971) . 
. :' 104. But see text accompanying notes 135-40 infra . 
. 105. See Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 332 (Me. 1973). 
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debtors rarely go to collateral resales,106 and usually do not repur­
chase the collateral. Therefore, denying a deficiency judgment is 
too drastic a remedy. 107 
The damage which the unnotified debtor suffers is not easily 
gauged. It is difficult to prove whether the debtor would have bid 
at the sale,108 arranged for someone to buy the collateral at an ad­
vantageous price109 or even paid off the obligation himself.110 Loss 
of the right of redemption cannot be compensated accurately. As a 
practical matter, barring a deficiency recovery is not a viable 
alternative for the debtor, and it should not be given misplaced 
emphasis by holding that cancellation of indebtedness is the only 
adequate remedy for its loss. 111 Denying deficiency judgments for 
commercial unreasonableness compensates the debtor for much 
more than what he lost, and it contradicts the U.C.C.'s purpose of 
avoiding punitive damages in commercial transactions. 112 
One commentator suggests that courts deny deficiency judg­
ments to secured parties because of a judicial hostility toward cred­
itors who seek them. 113 This hostility might derive from knowledge 
that the resale price of second-hand property is usually low. 114 Two 
cases indicate that deficiency judgments were denied because of 
bias against secured parties pursuing deficiency judgments. 11s One 
case states that deficiencies should be denied because of "the reali­
ties of the relationships between secured creditors and debtors who 
have defaulted and their respective resources for prosecuting law­
suits. . . . "116 Another characterized failure to give notice as "the 
106. See G. GILMORE, supra note 27, at 1216. 
107. Note, Secured Transactions-New jersey Upholds the Right of a Secured 
Party to Collect a Deficiency judgment Under U.C.C. § 9-504(2) Although Notice 
Provisions of § 9-504(3) Were Not Observed, 76 DICK. L. REV. 394, 401 (1972). 
108. Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa. 
(1963). 
109. Moody v. Nides Fin. Co., 115 Ga. App. 859, 860,156 S.E.2d 310, 311 (1967). 
(1967). 
110. Id. 
111. Note, supra note 47, at 78. 
112. See text accompanying notes 97-99, supra. 
113. White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales, 
and Deficiency judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 808, 833 (1970). 
114. D. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 5.12, at 390 (1973). 
115. See generally Note, supra note 47, at 62 (judge's perception of deficiency 
judgments as either equitable or onerous will dictate whether deficiency judgments 
will be granted to the secured party). 
116. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 
1093,323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 17 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972). 
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quick and easy way out. . . . "117 Regardless of whether the failure 
to give notice was accidental or intentional, inflicting punitive dam­
ages11S upon the secured party is inappropriate to the U.C.c.n9 
Public policy arguments favor repudiation of a bar against defi­
ciency judgments. Denying creditors recovery of the amount still 
owed them forces them to bear the cost of the debtor's loan. In re­
sponse, lenders may choose to restrict their credit or to pass the 
cost on to consumers or business associates who will ultimately 
bear the cost of the debtor's default. 120 
B. Section 9-507(1) as Exclusive Remedy-Pro and Con 
The minority view121 allows the secured party a deficiency 
judgment regardless of unreasonable disposition. A secured party's 
failure to comply with Code repossession and resale requirements 
affords the debtor the remedy of pursuing an action to recover 
any loss under section 9-507(1). The burden of proof is on the 
debtor,122 who, in a deficiency action, may receive damages as a 
matter of setoff or counterclaim. 123 Not surprisingly, those courts 
which consider section 9-507(1) to be the debtor's exclusive remedy 
for losses incurred because of creditor misbehavior124 base their 
position on the fact that section 9-507(1) is the only specific U.C.C. 
provision for a penalty in the event of a defective disposition. 125 
The "sensible thing is to apply the Code penalty and no more."126 
117. Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659, 663 
(W.D. Okla. 1972). 
118. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra. 
119. Punitive damages are traditionally not awarded in contract actions. White 
v. Metropolitan Merchandise Mart, 107 A.2d 892, 894 (Del. 1954); D. CALAMARI & J. 
PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-3, at 520 (2d ed. 1977); 11 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 1340, at 209 (3d ed. 1968); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of 
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (1970); Simpson, Punitive Damages for 
Breach of Contract, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 284, 284 (1959) (punitive damages would cause 
uncertainty in business transactions). 
120. Note, Commercial Law-Uniform Commercial Code-Article Nine: 
Nebraska Supreme Court Demands Strict Compliance with Terms of § 9-504(3) if 
Creditor is to Recover a Deficiency Judgment-DeLay First National Bank and Trust 
Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 26, 45 (1977). 
121. Lakin, supra note 50, at 30. 
122. [d. at 26. 
123. Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35, reprinted in 5 
V.C.C. REP. SERVo 788,791 (1964); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. 
App. 106, 115,41.5 SW.2d 347, 352 (1966). 
124. See note 51 supra. 
125. See Hogan, supra note 49, at 978, reprinted in 2 V.C.C. L.J. 244, 257 
(1970). 
126. [d., reprinted in 2 V.C.C.L.J. at 257. See R. HENSON, SECURED TRANS­
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Courts which have permitted deficiency recoveries, and which 
have awarded the injured debtor only section 9-507(1) damages, 127 
have had to grapple with the unresolved question of whether the 
Code supports precluding deficiency judgments in favor of mis­
behaving secured parties, as the majority contends. Limitation of 
the debtor's remedy to those losses which he can prove under sec­
tion 9-507(1) is an option frequently chosen by the courts when 
balanced against the only perceived alternative of denying a defi­
ciency altogether. In view of the section 9-507(1) remedy, one 
court held that the Code drafters did not intend that failure to give 
notice would result in forfeiture of the creditor's right to a defi­
ciency.128 Consequently, that court chose section 9-507(1). Another 
court found it was unlikely that section 9-507(1) would have been 
included in the Code or enacted by its own state legislature had 
the drafters intended that the secured party also lose his right to 
recover a deficiency. 129 
In Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard,130 the court held 
that a creditor's failure to comply fully with section 9-504(3)131 was 
not a meritorious defense to a deficiency action because "relief of 
an aggrieved debtor is relegated to the rights cited in Section 
9-507(1) U.C.C."132 The U.C.C. does not mention denial of a defi­
ciency judgment as a remedy. Its provision of an express remedy 
in section 9-507(1) for any damages the debtor suffers would ap­
pear, on the contrary, to preclude him from setting up a section 
9-504(3) violation as a bar. 133 In addition, these courts reason that 
section 9-507(1) offers sufficient compensatory protection134 to the 
debtor. 
It is ironic that the only remedy for wrongful creditor conduct 
in Article 9 is seldom used by the courts as the debtor's relieP35 
ACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10.6, at 360 (2d ed. 1979); 
Hogan, supra note 71 (§ 9-507(1) is arguably exclusive since it is the only remedy 
in the Code); Clark, supra note 50, at 311 (author reluctantly concedes that § 9-507(1) 
"occupies the field" since the U .C.C. offers no other remedies). 
127. See note 51 supra. 
128. Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972). 
129. United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692, 696 n.6 (5th CiT. 
1974). 
130. 75 Misc. 2d 181,347 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Rochester, N.Y. City Court 1973). 
131. Id. at 181-83,347 N.Y.S.2d at 307-09. 
132. Id. at 182,347 N.Y.S.2d at 308. 
133. Barbour v. United States, 562 F.2d 19,21 (10th Cir. 1977). 
134. Associates Fin. Servs. Co. v. DiMarco, 383 A.2d 296, 302 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1978); accord, Jones v. Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 455, 461, 228 N.W.2d 419, 424 (1975). 
135. See note 51 supra. 
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Such a sparse following may indicate an inadequacy in the rule. 
The courts have not articulated their dissatisfaction;136 rather, the 
little criticism that exists has been raised by commentators. 137 
The primary fault with section 9-507(1), providing for compen­
sation for any loss suffered by the debtor, is that it sometimes 
gives the debtor an insurmountable burden of proof of loss.138 
Section 9-507(1) is consistent with general V.C.C. principles, offer­
ing compensatory and not punitive relief to the injured party, and 
is not objectionable on that ground. The difficult burden of proof 
required of the debtor when collateral is sold improperly, that of 
proving the collateral's fair market value at the time of sale,139 has 
made the courts reluctant to rely on it. 140 
C. 	 Rebuttable Presumption Remedy 
Judging from the paucity of its use by the courts, the Code 
remedy for creditor misbehavior set forth in section 9-507(1) is in­
adequate. Courts are unwilling to require debtors to prove what 
they lost by disproving the secured party's claim for a deficiency 
judgment. Courts reason that if the secured party's misbehavior 
jeopardized the debtor's right to redeem, or his right to receive 
the best possible price for his collateral, the creditor should have 
some responsibility in maintaining his action for a deficiency. 
Courts either can require the debtor to prove affirmatively what 
the secured party gained, or can require the secured party to sub­
stantiate the amount of the deficiency remaining after the improper 
136. Perhaps this is because § 9-507(1) is normally chosen by the courts as the 
only alternative in the face of the rule barring deficiency judgments completely. 
137. According to commentators, a recurring reason for applying a remedy 
other than § 9-507( 1) is that nothing in the U .C.C. says § 9-507( 1) is exclusive. 
Minetz, supra note 52. Another line of reasoning is that § 9-507(1) is inadequate pro­
tection for the debtor. Note, supra note 50, at 662. 
138. 	 Note, supra note 47, at 78. 
139. Comment, supra note 51, at 227 (asserting nevertheless that the burden 
should be on the debtor because it is too onerous for the creditor). 
140. After a commercially unreasonable sale, when the secured party seeks a 
deficiency judgment, some courts suggest that the debtor proceed via § 9-507(1) to 
recover his losses, with the burden of proof shifted within that section to the secured 
party. Two cases suggest this solution. United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 
F.2d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 1974), proposed that the debtor submit any evidence in a § 
9-507(1) action that he was prejudiced by lack of notice, thereby shifting the burden 
to the secured party to rebut such evidence by showing that the fair market value of 
the goods was no more than the amount received. In Associates Fin. Servs. Co. v. 
DiMarco, 383 A.2d 296, 302 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978), the court held that there is ample 
compensatory protection for debtors in § 9-507(1), so in the event of an unreasonable 
disposition, the debtor's losses should be offset against the deficiency judgment, sup­
ported by a presumption favorable to the debtor. 
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foreclosure sale by proving fair market value. Section 9-507(1) does 
nothing to adjust the equities when the secured party has failed to 
comply with the Code's requirement of commercial reasonableness. 
Nothing makes the debtor's lot in proving his loss any easier. 
Rather than barring a deficiency judgment entirely, or at the 
other extreme, forcing the debtor under section 9-507(1) to prove 
the fair market value of the collateral and thereby the amount of 
unjust gain by the secured party, the courts are increasingly 
adopting141 what they consider a fairer,142 more enlightened143 
and equitable144 interpretation of Article 9, the rebuttable pre­
sumption. 145 The increasing146 number of courts147 have modified 
the V.C.C. by switching the burden of proof as to the collateral's 
market value from debtor to creditor, starting with the rebuttable 
presumption that the price equalled the debt. In a deficiency ac­
tion by the secured party, if the debtor raises a defense of com­
mercial unreasonableness and responds that the plaintiff violated 
the V.C.C., the secured party must show that every aspect of the 
sale was commercially reasonable. 148 Such evidence would com­
pletely exonerate the secured party. If he fails to demonstrate com­
pliance, a rebuttable presumption arises that the sale price was 
equal to the debtor's remaining obligation, effectively extinguishing 
the debt. 149 
To overcome the rebuttable presumption, the secured party 
must produce a fair and reasonable appraisal at or near the time of 
repossession, or other convincing evidence of the value of the col­
lateral. 150 If the secured party meets this burden of proof, he can 
141. See note 52 supra. . 
142. 59 App. Div. 2d at 246,399 N.Y.S.2d at 513. 
143. United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 260 (6th Cir. 1979). 
144. 59 App. Div. 2d at 247,399 N.Y.S.2d at 514. 
145. Note, supra note 47, at 72 (the "intennediate approach"); Pass & Walker, 
supra note 52, at 720 (the "liberal rule"). It has been adopted because it is the "just 
solution." Norton v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 150, 398 S.W.2d 538, 542 
(1966); Savings Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn. Super. 632, 634, 382 A.2d 226, 228 (1977) 
("just and fair"); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 60 Ind. Dec. 221, _, 370 N.E.2d 
918, 928, reprinted in 23 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 267 (Ct. App. 1977) (the "better rule of 
law" and "sound policy"); Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Mo. App. 1974) 
("a more just remedy"). 
146. United States V. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 258 (6th CiL 1979) (the "great 
weight of authority"). 
147. See note 52 supra. 
148. Vic Hansen & Sons v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203 NW.2d 728 (1973). 
149. This procedure is described in Savings Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn. Super. 
632, 634, 382 A.2d 226, 228 (1977). 
150. Kobuk Eng'r & Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr. Co­
Alaska, Inc. 568 P.2d 1007, 1013-14 (Alaska 1977). 
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recover the amount by which the deficiency exceeded the amount 
the collateral would have brought had the Code requirements been 
met. 151 The debtor's other damages, if any, are set off against this 
sum.l52 This actual debtor loss is separate and distinct from the 
losses incurred because of the secured party's breach of commercial 
reasonableness. 153 Failure to meet the burden of proof as to fair 
market value results in a forfeiture of the deficiency. 
The leading case of Norton v. National Bank of Commerce 154 
originated the rebuttable presumption technique. The Arkansas Su­
preme Court reasoned that simple considerations of fair play cast 
the burden of proof upon the secured party after a wrongful dispo­
sition of collateral. Failing to give notice to the debtor of the collat­
eral resale made it at least difficult, if not impossible for the 
debtor to prove his loss with reasonable certainty, and the secured 
party should not be able to derive an advantage from his miscon­
duct. 155 As Norton illustrates, the rebuttable presumption exists 
because, when a sale is not commercially reasonable, the amount 
received at the sale is not evidence of the fair market value of the 
collateral. The secured party, who caused the problem by his fail­
ure to obtain the best possible price for the collateral,156 should be 
responsible for proving the fair market value. A deficiency would 
then be measured by the difference between debt and the estab­
lished fair market value. "It follows that he who has the duty 
should also have the burden of proof. "157 
The effect of the rebuttable presumption is not to eliminate 
but to decrease the amount of deficiency recoverable158 by off­
setting the fair and reasonable value of the collateral against the 
balance due. 159 Justification for rearranging the burden of proof as 
151. Universal C.l.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 672, 453 S.W.2d 37, 41 
(1970). 
152. Community Management Ass'n of Colorado Springs, Inc. v. Tousley, 32 
Colo. App. 33, 39, 505 P.2d 1314, 1317 (1973) (secured party liable to debtor for dam­
ages); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402, 404 
(1971). 
153. Walker v. V.M. Box Motor Co., 325 So.2d 905, 906 (Miss. 1976). 
154. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). Norton has tremendous influence 
and is cited in virtually every case adopting the rebuttable presumption. 
155. Id. at 149, 398 S.W.2d at 542. 
156. Vic Hansen & Sons v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, llO, 203 N.W.2d 728, 
732 (1973). 
157. [d. 
158. Kobuk Eng'r & Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr. Co­
Alaska, Inc., 568 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska 1977). 
159. Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 501, 209 N.W.2d 341, 344 
(1973). 
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to the collateral's fair market value has been deemed appropriate to 
the V.C.C.'s "spirit of commercial reasonableness,"160 being "more 
in keeping with the scheme of the Code" than other rules. 161 
The Indiana Court of Appeals, in adopting the rebuttable pre­
sumption approach, considered the deficiency judgment dilemma 
in the context of the entire commercial setting:162 "[W]e feel that 
the VCC should function on the premise that the majority of com­
mercial transactions are carried out in good faith. "163 When the se­
cured party has not proceeded in good faith, the court preferred a 
flexible standard which would allow the secured party to recover 
the damages caused by the debtor's default, but which would pro­
tect the debtor on a case by case basis. 164 
Shifting the burden of proof of fair market value to the se­
cured party reaches a middle ground between that method which 
is hard on the debtor, requiring him to bear the difficult burden of 
proof of his loss, and that which imposes a harsh result on the 
creditor, cutting off the deficiency owed him. It is primarily the 
latter which the rebuttable presumption method rejects. 165 
While the no-deficiency rule purportedly encourages creditors 
to comply with the section 9-504(3) requirement of commercial rea­
sonableness by denying a deficiency when Article 9 has not been 
followed, one commentator166 suggests that the rebuttable pre­
sumption rule achieves the same result. It discourages noncompli­
ance by exacting a penalty from secured parties. The latter 
method, unlike the no-deficiency rule, does not penalize creditors 
for "not doing what the Code drafters did not define and what the 
courts cannot explain. "167 Requiring the secured party to demon­
160. Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 386, 276 A.2d 402, 
404 (1971). 
161. United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, SOl F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1974). 
162. Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 60 Ind. Dec. 221, _, 370 N.E.2d 918, 
928, reprinted in 23 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 267 (Ct. App. 1977). 
163. Debtor defaults, creditor repossessions, and foreclosure sales occur rela­
tively infrequently, considering the annual volume of secured transactions. Lakin, 
supra note 50, at 1. Since 1945 the percentage of installment contracts delinquent 
one month or more has remained at the relatively constant rate of three percent of 
the total number of outstanding loans. Id. at 1 n.2. 
164. Hall V. Owen County State Bank, 60 Ind. Dec. 221, 370 N.E.2d 918, re­
printed in 23 U.C.C. REP. SERVo 267 (Ct. App. 1977). 
165. The federal court in United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979), 
refused to follow established Ohio precedent barring deficiency judgments because 
the justices believed "that the rebuttable presumption rule is the more enlightened 
and equitable." Id. at 260. 
166. Pass & Walker, supra note 52, at 722. 
167. Id. at 723. 
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strate fulfillment of his duty under section 9-504(3) prior to recov­
ering a deficiency judgment will encourage compliance without 
penalizing the creditor.16s 
The only inadequacy of the rebuttable presumption approach, 
as it has developed, is that there has been no attempt to reconcile 
it with Article 9 other than by saying that it is complimentary to 
the spirit of the Code. 169 The cases adopting the rebuttable pre­
sumption technique are at least beginning to have precedent to 
buttress their arguments. 170 There is, however, a distinct lack of 
effort to find a niche for it in Article 9. 
Requiring the secured party to prove the market value of col­
lateral sold improperly must be harmonized with the pertinent 
Code ·provisions. Section 9-504(2) creates an affirmative duty on the 
part of the debtor to repay to the secured party any deficiency 
remaining from the sale of goods securing an indebtedness. The 
only restriction placed on the secured party's method of disposition 
is that it be commercially reasonable. l71 The consequences of a 
noncomplying sale are not dealt with in section 9-504(2). Article 9' s 
default provisions are arranged so that remedies appear in section 
9-507(1),172 and that section is silent as to the effect of a commer­
cially unreasonable sale on the secured party's right to collect a de­
ficiency judgment. 
The rebuttable presumption's function determines its relation 
to Article 9. The rebuttable presumption that resale price equals 
debt, shifting to the secured party the burden of proof of fair mar­
ket value, has the effect of redefining deficiency as the difference 
between fair market value and debt. The rebuttable presumption 
rejects the definition of deficiency in an unreasonable sale as the 
difference between resale price and debt. By defining deficiency 
as the difference between fair market value and debt in section 
9-504(2) and integrating the rebuttable presumption into section 
9-504(2), Article 9 will be equipped to resolve all deficiency ac­
tions, whether or not the disposition of collateral was reasonable. 
In a commercially reasonable sale, the collateral's resale price 
168. Fedders Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961,972 (D. Minn. 1979). 
169. Another criticism is that the rebuttable presumption is a highly fictional 
artifice and essentially a fraud. Clark, supra note 50, at 320. Shifting the burden of 
proof to the creditor is criticized as an unfairly heavy burden for him to bear. Com­
ment, supra note 51, at 232. 
170. See note 52 supra. 
171. V.C.C. § 9-504, Official Comment 1 (1972). 
172. See V.C.C. § 9-501(3)(e) (1972). 
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and fair market value are the same. Deficiency, without being 
defined as such in section 9-504(2), means the difference between 
fair market value and debt. In a commercially unreasonable dispo­
sition, the definition of deficiency should remain as the differ­
ence between fair market value and debt. Resale price, however, is 
not evidence of fair market value because of the nature of the sale. 
The rebuttable presumption puts the burden of proof of estab­
lishing fair market value on the party seeking to collect the defi­
ciency judgment. 
Defining deficiency in section 9-504(2) as the difference be­
tween fair market value and debt resolves the Article 9 dilemma of 
what to do when a misbehaving secured party seeks a deficiency 
judgment. In that case, there is no evidence of fair market value; 
resale price is evidence of unfair market value. The rebuttable pre­
sumption places the burden of proof on the secured party. Shifting 
the burden in this way is an equitable solution developed by the 
courts to solve a statutory ambiguity. 
Discussion of two areas of the V.C.C. will demonstrate that 
the rebuttable presumption is compatible with the V.C.C. First, 
the V.C.C. was designed to integrate common law remedies to 
unforeseen difficulties into its statutory provisions. 173 Secondly, the 
rebuttable presumption reaches the same result as an analogous 
section of Article 2. Sections 2-706 and 2-708 force a debtor to for­
feit the amount by which goods' resale price was reduced on resale 
due to the seller's commercial unreasonableness. Comment 1 to 
section 9-504(2) alludes to section 2-706 as its model. 
III. V.C.C. PROVISIONS 
V.C.C. section 1-102 requires a liberal construction of the 
Code so that its underlying purposes and policies are furthered. 
Flexibility through expansion of commercial practices and remedies 
is not only permitted, but also encouraged. The intent to incorpo­
rate common law remedies which conform to the Code's purposes 
and policies is illustrated by Official Comment 1 to section 1-102: 
[Sections 1-102(1) and (2) are] intended to make it possible for 
the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in 
the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices . 
. . . [Courts] have implemented a statutory policy with liberal 
and useful remedies not provided in the statutory text. They 
have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the rea­
173. 	 See U.C.C. § 1-102, Official Comment 1 (1972). 
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son of the limitation did not apply. . . . Nothing in this Act 
stands in the way of the continuance of such action by the 
courts. 
If shifting the burden of proving fair market value to the secured 
party enhances the purposes and policies of the V.C.C., then shift­
ing that burden of proof in the Article 9 determination of the se­
cured party's deficiency may be appropriate. Were section 1-102 
the only applicable Code provision, it could also support barring 
deficiency judgments altogether as a supplemental remedy devel­
oped by the courts. 
Crucial policies regarding remedies are found in section 
1-106(1): 
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally adminis­
tered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good 
a position as if the other party had fully performed but neither 
consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except 
as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law. 
The drafters wanted this section to "make it clear that com­
pensatory damages are limited to compensation. "174 Denying the 
creditor money due him on a debt does not compensate the debtor 
for his losses. Conversely, it almost always puts the debtor in a 
better position than if the creditor had sold the collateral at the 
highest available price. 175 Giving the debtor more than what is due 
to him under the commercial agreement is punitive to the secured 
party. It deprives the secured party of money he bargained for and 
which the debtor promised to pay. 176 
The objective of placing the aggrieved party in as good a posi­
tion as if the other had fully performed will be achieved in the im­
proper foreclosure sale situation by setting off the amount which a 
proper sale would have brought against the debtor's remaining 
debt. In this way, both parties will be compensated for what they 
lost due to the debtor's default and the secured party's unreason­
able conduct. The debtor will be credited for what he lost because 
of the defective disposition of his collateral; and the secured party 
will collect the amount still owing him, minus any sum that was 
lost by his getting too Iowa price for the collateral. 
The technique of requiring the secured party to prove fair 
market value is also appropriate when the creditor fails to notify 
174. V.C.C. § 1-106, Official Comment 1 (1972). 
175. R. Pass & B. Walker, supra note 52, at 723. 
176. See cases, note 52 supra. 
519 1980] DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS 
the debtor of the sale. The debtor, not having been present at the 
sale, cannot be sure that the price obtained or the manner in 
which the sale was conducted, was commercially reasonable. He 
also may have been able to redeem the collateral by arranging for 
credit if he had been notified of the time of the sale. Finally, it 
would be unfair to demand that the debtor prove the fair market 
value when it was the secured party who created the entire prob­
lem through bad faith dealing, or otherwise overlooking the debt­
or's rights. 
Finally, analogy to the sales provisions of Article 2 is instruc­
tive. According to Official Comment 1 to section 9-504, the only 
restriction placed on the secured party's method of disposition is 
that it must be commercially reasonable. In this respect, the Com­
ment continues, section 9-504 follows the section 2-706 provisions 
on resale by a seller following a buyer's rejection of goods. 177 
Whether the authors of that Comment intended to draw a parallel 
between the sections respecting only the requirement of commer­
cial reasonableness, or whether they meant that the principles of 
awarding damages were similar, analogy to Article 2 is useful be­
cause of its treatment of damages when the seller resells goods re­
jected by the buyer. 
When the buyer wrongfully rejects the goods,178 the seller 
may resell them, and, when the resale is made in good faith and 
in a commercially reasonable manner, the seller may recover. the 
difference between the resale price and the contract price. IT the 
resale price is less than the market price, the seller can recover 
that entire difference. If the seller on reselling the goods fails to 
act properly, he is deprived of section 2-706 damages and is rele­
gated to section 2-708 damages. 179 These damages calculate the dif­
ference between the market price at the time and place for tender, 
and the unpaid contract price. The section 2-706 resale price which 
probably would be lower than the market price is not used. The 
seller forfeits the difference between what the Code presumes to 
be an abnormally low price obtained because of bad commercial 
practices, and the going market price. 
Making the secured party forfeit the amount which was lost 
because of poor commercial practices is also the result the rebutta­
177. V.C.C. § 9-504, Official Comment 1 (1972) says that in the respect that 
both § 2-706 and § 9-504 sellers are required to be commercially reasonable, § 9-504 
follows § 2-706. 
178. V.C.C. § 2-703. 
179. V.C.C. § 2-706, Official Comment 2 (1972). 
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ble presumption seeks to reach. It is consistent with Article 2. The 
Article 9 secured party, equivalent to the Article 2 seller, may 
likewise resell the collateral upon default by the debtor. This is 
equivalent· to an Article 2 rejection of the goods by the buyer. 
When the secured party acts in a commercially reasonable manner, 
he can collect the deficiency remaining between the resale price 
and the entire remaining amount of the debt. This is analogous to 
the contract price that remains unpaid in an Article 2 sale. 
Article 2 and the Article 9 rebuttable presumption differ 
when the secured party, the seller, is not commercially reasonable. 
Underlying the difference is that the section 2-708 market value of 
goods is much easier to prove than that of collateral sold publicly 
or privately by section 9-504. Collateral resold under Article 9 is 
almost always used and difficult to value, whereas Article 2 goods 
are usually new. Section 2-724 also makes market quotations re­
ported in official publications, trade journals, newspapers or peri­
odicals admissible evidence of the price or value of goods. lsO 
Switching the burden of proof to the secured party imposes a 
difficult responsibility on him. If he can produce proof of fair mar­
ket value he can, like a section 2-708 seller, recover the difference 
between this amount and the unpaid contract price. But if proof 
is not produced, the deficiency is disallowed and the amount re­
ceived on sale of the collateral is considered to extinguish the debt. 
Such a departure from the equivalent Article 2 sections is justifi­
able because proving market value in collateral foreclosure sales is 
difficult. If the creditor cannot produce proof of fair market value, 
his deficiency judgment cannot even be estimated, thereby pre­
cluding an award. Nor, if the creditor fails to produce evidence of 
the fair market value can the debtor be asked to prove it, since he 
is at a disadvantage, having inferior knowledge about the sale. The 
overall similarity between Article 2 and Article 9, when the rebut­
table presumption is in effect as part of section 9-504(2), is persua­
sive evidence that the result Article 2 reaches is what the Article 9 
drafters intended. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts have tried continually to clarify the gap in the default 
provisions of Article 9 regarding the creditor's right to a deficiency 
judgment following his commercial unreasonableness in a collateral 
180. U .C.C. § 2-708, Official Comment 1 (1972) allows proof of market price to 
be made by a substitute market if price is not available via § 2-723. Section 2-724 
makes market quotations admissible evidence of price. 
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foreclosure sale. Three different approaches have developed to deal 
with the secured party's right to a deficiency judgment in this situ­
ation. The majority of courts make commercial reasonableness a 
condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency, barring a defi­
ciency when this condition is not met. There is a major flaw with 
this remedy: the cancellation of indebtedness awarded the debtor 
is unrelated to damages actually suffered by the debtor. The 
debtor, therefore, is awarded punitive damages, a remedy incompati­
ble with the U.C.C.'s avowed philosophy of making damages com­
pensatory and not punitive. 
The second approach, which is the least followed, uses section 
9-507(1) as the debtor's exclusive remedy. It requires the debtor to 
prove the fair market value of the collateral in order to defeat a de­
ficiency judgment. Section 9-507(1) has proven inadequate when 
commercial unreasonableness is asserted as a defense to a creditor's 
deficiency action because it requires the defendant, the debtor, to 
bear the burden of disproving the claim of the plaintiff, the se­
cured party. Since there is no established market for most used 
collateral, proving fair market value is difficult. Also, the secured 
party should not be able to reap the benefit of his own negligence 
at the foreclosure sale by imposing this difficult burden of proof on 
the debtor. 
In the more enlightened view, a rebuttable presumption arises 
that the collateral as sold equals the entire remaining debt. The 
burden of proof of fair market value at the time of sale switches to 
the secured party and, unless the secured party meets his burden 
of proof, the resale price is considered to extinguish the debt. The 
underlying theory is that since the creditor proceeded in bad faith, 
the sale price cannot be considered as evidence of the collateral's 
actual value, and that value must be substantiated by further proof. 
This method of adjusting the equities between debtor and 
creditor is compatible with the purpose of the U.C.C. to compen­
sate the aggrieved party. The Code explicitly provides for liberal 
construction of its provisions181 to give courts flexibility in devel­
oping their own remedies, as long as they conform to the Code's 
purposes and policies. 182 The rebuttable presumption that sale 
price equals debt is compatible with the Code, allowing both par­
ties to be compensated for their losses, yet it protects the debtor in 
those situations in which he is vulnerable. 
Defining deficiency in section 9-504(2) as the difference be­
181. V.C.C. § 1-106 (1972). 
182. V.C.C. § 1-102 (1972). 
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tween fair market value and debt is the crucial change which the 
rebuttable presumption effects. This definition eliminates the loss 
caused by the secured party's commercial unreasonableness which 
would exist when deficiency is defined as the difference between 
resale price and debt. 
Adopting this definition of deficiency effects the same result 
as that reached in Article 2 following a buyer's wrongful rejection 
of goods and resale by the seller. When resale is made in good 
faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, the seller may re­
cover the difference between resale price and contract price. If the 
seller fails to act properly, he is relegated to damages consisting of 
the difference between market price and the unpaid contract price. 
Depriving the secured party of the amount he lost because of poor 
commercial practices is the exact result the rebuttable presumption 
reaches. Since Comment 1 to section 9-504 alludes to following 
section 2-706, it is tenable to extrapolate that Article 9 intended to 
structure recovery of deficiency judgments according to the Article 
2 model. 
Elaine P. Lariviere 
